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BILL JOHNSON'S RESTAURANTS, INC. v. NLRB: REASONABLY
BASED, UNPREEMPTED LAWSUITS PRONOUNCED PALATABLE
AND UNENJOINABLE, DESPITE IMPROPER (RETALIATORY)
MOTIVATION.
After a fired employee filed unfair labor practice charges against a
restaurant owner in August 1978,1 the employer-restaurant owners filed
suit in state court for damages and injunctive relief. The employer alleged
that the employee had engaged in business interference activities (mass
picketing, harassing customers, blocking access to the restaurant, and
creating a threat to public safety) and had libeled the owners by the
knowingly false statements contained in leaflets. The employee then filed
a second charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
* Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The NLRB found, in its decision and order in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
and Myrland R. Helton, 249 NLRB 155, 160 (1980), that the surrounding facts of the
initial complaint supported a finding that the restaurant, in discharging Helton, was
motivated by its knowledge that she was a union adherent, and that the reasons advanced
for her firing were false. The facts accepted by the administrative law judge (ALJ) and
affirmed by the Board indicated that Helton was a senior waitress covering the coveted
breakfast shift, the only one to receive a large bonus, and had never previously been
reprimanded. At a meeting of management with waitresses not on the breakfast shift,
those employees were told of a crackdown as to strict enforcement of company rules
under penalty of discharge. Such rules included: no gum-chewing, no using a company
phone for personal calls, and mandatory call-in on designated "call days." Following the
meeting, Helton was told the rules did not apply to breakfast shift waitresses. Feeling
insecure with the suggested rules, she recommended to the other employees that they
investigate union representation. Shortly thereafter, she was fired, allegedly for breaking
the above-listed "rules." No other employee was fired, though others broke the same
rules. Id. at 157-58. The Board found the firing in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, id. at 160. This section, as amended, now apj0ears at 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1983) and provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. . ..
This finding was upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1981). Sanctions imposed by the Board under the NLRA
were upheld by the Court of Appeals, including posting of a notice of the order,
reinstatement of Helton, and payment by respondent restaurant to all defendants in the
civil complaint (state lawsuit) for all legal expenses incurred in defense of the civil suit
(in effect, plaintiff paying defendants).
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Board), alleging that the employer had filed the state suit in retaliation
for her protected, concerted union organizational activities, and for her
unfair labor practice charges protesting her discharge. 2 In January 1979,
the United States District Court denied the Board's October 1978 petition
under section 100) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the
Act") for an order enjoining the employer from continuing the state
court suit, pending a final Board decision.3 The state court dismissed
the employee's motion for summary judgment on the employer's business
interference claims and the employees' abuse of process counter-claims
in May 1979, but retained the libel claim for trial. Furthermore, the
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment in the same
state-court suit on the employee's counter-claims of abuse of process,
malicious prosecution, and wrongful injunction but also retained the
employee's counter-claim of libel for trial.4 In September 1978, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) rendered his decision on the consolidated
unfair labor practice charges which he had heard in December 1978.
He found that the institution of the civil suit was for the purpose of
penalizing the employee and discouraging her from filing Board charges
under section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA and therefore constituted an unfair
labor practice.' On appeal, the Board in April 1980 adopted the ALJ's
findings, with minor amendments. The employer petitioned to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals for judicial review. The Board sought en-
forcement, and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order in
November 1981.
A unanimous Supreme Court, with Justice Brennan concurring, held
that the prosecution of an unpreempted, reasonably based state court
lawsuit by an employer is not enjoinable regardless of the employer's
retaliatory motive. The Court further held that an unfair labor practice
2. 249 NLRB at 165.
3. The Supreme Court stated in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S.
Ct. 2161, 2174 n.15 (1983), that this denial was based on the erroneous impression that
a state suit could never be enjoined unless it sought an unlawful objective.
4. See 103 S. Ct. at 2166 n.2. Either the pendancy of the libel claims was not
considered by the ALJ or it was not brought to his attention by the employer when he
finally made his determination on September 27, 1979 that the employer's suit lacked a
reasonable basis.
5. See infra note 17. See also Power Systems, Inc., 239 NLRB 445, 449-50 (1978),
enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979), in which the Board held that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to institute a civil lawsuit for the purpose of
penalizing or discouraging its employees from filing charges with the Board or seeking
access to Board processes. The Board also inferred that the employer acted with a retaliatory
motive from the fact that the suit lacked a reasonable basis.
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may be found if a retaliatory motive is established and the state court
suit is finally adjudged unmeritorious. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
In determining whether under the facts and circumstances of Bill
Johnson's the Board could stop the proceedings in a state-court suit
and whether the filing of such state-court suit, with a retaliatory motive,
was an unfair labor practice, the Court touched upon labor history.
This included a treatment of the limited circumstances under which such
a state-court suit was not preempted by federal law (the NLRA) and
the vacillating positions which the Board had taken in prior "improper
motive" cases. This history is more fully developed in the following
pages. Since the Court analogized this labor problem to those found in
the antitrust arena, a brief history of the development of antitrust's
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its "sham" exception will also be traced
here. Implicit in this analogy is a need to discuss the Constitutional
ramifications of the First Amendment, the Supremacy and Commerce
clauses, and the similarity of policies underlying antitrust and labor
legislation based on the Commerce Clause.
The Prior Labor History
The Unpreempted Suit Determination
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,6 unions which
had not been designated as collective bargaining agents of employees of
a lumber business began peaceful picketing and the business refused to
sign an agreement to retain or employ only workers who were or became
union members. The unions further exerted pressure on suppliers and
customers to coerce the employer to sign the union-shop agreement. The
employer filed a state-court suit, and the California court awarded it
injunctive relief and damages. The union then filed a representation
petition with the NLRB, but the Board refused to take jurisdiction on
the basis of insufficient business volume. The Supreme Court found
that the Board's jurisdiction preempted both state and federal courts7
and set out the test for deciding which activities were not to be state
regulated: activities either clearly protected under section 7 of the NLRA
or clearly prohibited under section 8; and activities even arguably pro-
tected or prohibited under the NLRA.8 However, the Garmon Court
listed two exceptions under which state courts were not preempted from
6. 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959).
7. Id. at 245, 79 S. Ct. at 780.
8. Id.
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taking jurisdiction: (1) activities deemed of "merely peripheral concern" 9
to a uniform national labor policy,'0 and (2) activities under which the
conduct sought to be regulated "touched interests so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility."'
The second exception has been considerably expanded beyond the
pre-Garmon feeling that it extended only to maintenance of the domestic
peace and came into play only where conduct was violent or threatening
violence.' 2 After Garmon, state jurisdiction to enforce its own laws was
found not to be preempted by the NLRA for knowing, malicious libel
during a union organizing campaign;' 3 the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress; 4 and, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters,5 peaceful, though trespassory, picketing.
In Sears, the company sought in state court to have the picketers removed
from their private sidewalks to the public sidewalks some distance away.
Here the employer could not have filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board, and the union itself had not filed such a claim. The
Court therefore modified the Garmon test. It found the state's juris-
diction not preempted even for "arguably protected," and "arguably
prohibited" conduct where: (1) the state's interest is high and the issues
proposed to be presented to the NLRB and state court are not identical;
and (2) the aggrieved party cannot meet the requirements for bringing
his case to the Board and the opposing party has forfeited its oppor-
tunity to do so. 6
Another extension of the non-preemption exemption of state court
jurisdiction in matters of "deeply rooted local concern" occurred after
the Bill Johnson's decision. In June 1983, the Court in Belknap, Inc.
v. Hale7 pronounced valid a Kentucky state-court action for misrepre-
sentation and breach of contract, brought by fired replacement workers
hired during a strike. The contractor had promised permanent jobs to
9. Id. at 243, 79 S. Ct. at 779.
10. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S. Ct. 923
(1958), in which purely internal union matters were at issue.
11. 359 U.S. at 244, 79 S. Ct. at 779.
12. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S. Ct.
833 (1954).
13. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local No. 114, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.
Ct. 657 (1966).
14. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local No. 25, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.
Ct. 1056 (1977), in which the plaintiff-carpenter was involved in a dispute with his union
over failure to refer him for jobs. He subsequently accused union officials of verbal abuse
and other outrageous conduct.
15. 436 U.S. 180, 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978).
16. Id. at 185, 187, 197-98, 98 S. Ct. at 1751, 1752, 1757-58.
17. 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
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the workers, but in negotiating a strike settlement with union workers,
the union had induced the employer to fire the replacement workers as
part of the settlement."8
The first major case on whether the Board may issue a cease and
desist order to stop an allegedly retaliatory 9 state-court lawsuit filed by
an employer came before the Board in 1959. In W. T. Carter & Brothers,2 0
employers owned a "company town." It was therefore nearly impossible
to hold a sizable meeting of employees on property that would not be
company property. Resisting attempts by union organizers to obtain
representation of its employees, employers obtained a state court in-
junction to prohibit union meetings on their property and had local law
enforcement officials arrest the union organizers for trespass. The Board
found the company's actions to be improperly motivated by its desire
to prevent organizational meetings rather than by its interests in pro-
tecting its property. Finding this to be an unfair labor practice in
violation of section 8(a)(1), the Board held that the employer's right of
access to state courts was limited by the law of malicious prosecution
and wrongful institution of state court proceedings.' The dissenters in
Carter22 felt that an employer's right to seek relief in a judicial forum
should be recognized even if its motivation was to interfere with the
protected rights of employees.
Ten years later, in Clyde Taylor Co., 23 a former employee and now
successor employer in a sheet metal shop discharged union employees
and threatened to sue them for libel unless they dropped their unfair
labor practice charges. He also obtained a state court injunction banning
18. Id. at 3184.
19. See infra notes 77-81. In the context of a labor dispute and unfair labor practice
charge, retaliatorily motivated activity is that which is intended by the actor to restrain
the other party from exercising his § 7 rights and to penalize him if he does so. When,
however, the actor has in fact been injured by the other party and files suit to recover
damages for libel or other tortious conduct, Bill Johnson's recognizes the importance of
access to the courts despite the improper motivation. 103 S. Ct. at 2169. This distinction
is aptly made in two cases involving well-founded suits filed by citizens against federal
officials which were motivated by a desire to impede investigation or cause injury to the
official. In Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1343 (7th Cir. 1977)
and in United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1983), the courts noted
with approval the irrelevancy of the pleased feeling the plaintiff may have to his right
of petition under the First Amendment. They recognized that the possibility that a citizen
who feels himself to have been abused by a particular federal official may take satisfaction
when the official gets his perceived due is too human and common an emotion for First
Amendment protection to depend upon its absence. 547 F.2d at 1343; 710 F.2d at 1112.
20. 90 NLRB 2020 (1950).
21. Id. at 2023-25 (1950).
22. Id. at 2029 (1950) (Herzog, Chairman, dissenting).
23. 127 NLRB 103 (1960).
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peaceful picketing by the employees. Although the Board upheld the
trial examiner's finding of a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice for the
threats to sue for libel, it reversed the section 8(a)(1) unfair-labor-practice
finding for the employer's obtaining state court injunctive relief. To
that extent, it overruled Carter and adopted Carter's dissent.
24
During the 18 years between Taylor and Power Systems,21 not all
decisions followed the Taylor doctrine. In S. E. Nichols Marcy Corp.,
26
the Board found a supervisor's threats to file suit, but not its actual
filing, to be a section 8(a)(1) violation.27 The Board found the actual
filing of a state court suit to be an unfair labor practice in International
Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots. 2 Raising the bad faith issue,
the Board held in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
Union No. 1229 that, absent bad faith, even a suit filed claiming rights
pursuant to an illegal contract would not support a finding that the mere
filing of a state court suit violated the Act. In United Aircraft Corp.,30
the Board determined that neither a threat to file suit nor the actual filing
was an unfair labor practice. The filing of a state court suit to enforce
an illegal contract was held by the Board to be a section 8(a)(1)(A) unfair
labor practice in Television Wisconsin, Inc.3
The Board handed down its Power Systems 3 2 decision in 1978, the
same year that the ALJ took the Bill Johnson's consolidated unfair
24. Id. at 107-09.
25. 239 NLRB 445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
26. 229 NLRB 75 (1977). A company supervisor had threatened to file a slander suit
against an employee belonging to the meat cutters union. The employee claimed the
supervisor had threatened that she would lose her job if the employer found out she had
joined the union.
27. Id. at 75-77.
28. 224 NLRB 1626, 1626-27 (1976), enforced, 575 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1978). A
union had picketed a ship with the object of coercing ship owners into replacing its
present union crew with members of the picketing union. After the picketing efforts were
unsucessful, the union filed suit in state court.
29. 220 NLRB 530 (1975).
30. 192 NLRB 382, 382-84 (1971), modified, 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 825 (1976). After a prolonged and costly strike, a state court awarded damages
exceeding $1,000,000. The Board found the state court suit was not coercive but was
calculated to be a good faith attempt to negotiate an overall settlement of claims. The
Second Circuit modified other parts of the Board's opinion but upheld its determination
that neither a threat to file suit nor the actual filing constituted an unfair labor practice.
31. 224 NLRB 722, 778-80 (1976). A union filed suit for damages and fines, in a
coercive effort to get former union members to rejoin. The Board found that the union-
security provision was illegal in that it exceeded what § 8(a)(3) permitted. The union's
motive was found to be to enforce an unlawful clause and to restrain workers from
exercising their rights to cross a picket line and have the union decertified.
32. 239 NLRB 445 (1978). A millwright union steward was discharged, allegedly for
failing to perform assigned work and engaging in various unprotected activities which
NOTES
labor practice charges under advisement. In Power Systems the Board
found that an employer had not wrongfully discharged a millwright
union steward, and thus, the discharge was not an unfair labor practice.
However, since it found the employee's complaints to have a reasonable
basis, the employer's attempts to go to state court were designed to
penalize the employee and to discriminate against him. This was an
unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (4).33 The Seventh
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, finding that the record
did not support the ALJ's finding that the employer lacked a reasonable
basis for its civil action. It noted, however, that in a proper case the
Board could act to penalize the filing of civil suits for coercive purposes.3 4
The Board has consistently followed Power Systems since that time.
It does not regard lack of merit in the employer's suit as an independent
element of the unfair labor practice. In its view, a retaliatory motive
is the only necessary element of such a violation. 5 One such case decided
under Power Systems (which later became the first labor case to which
an appellate court applied the new Bill Johnson's standards) was Sheet
Metal Workers' Union Local 355.16 Judging from the diversity of opin-
ions over the years and the short length of time that Power Systems
had been followed (and the fact that the appellate court had found no
unfair labor practice), the precedent upon which the Board relied in
Bill Johnson's appears very weak.
The Prior Anti-Trust History
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 7 the anti-
trust case upon which Bill Johnson's was based, was decided in 1972;
it carved out the so-called "sham exception" to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine3" (which began with Noerr in 1960).
disrupted and delayed completion of the job. The steward alleged in complaints to OSHA
and the Board that he was fired for calling in the Atomic Energy Commission, for making
safety complaints, and for union activity. Discovering the steward's penchant for filing
unfair labor practice charges (40 of 46 had been dismissed or withdrawn in an 11-year
period), the employer filed suit in Illinois state court to recover legal fees incurred in
defense of the employee's two complaints. The employer claimed that these charges were
wrongful, malicious, without probable cause, and for the purpose of harrassing the
employer.
33. See infra note 60.
34. 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
35. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2168.
36. 254 NLRB 773, 778-80 (1980), rev'd in part, 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983). See
infra text accompaning notes 119-29.
37. 404 U.S. 508, 92 S. Ct. 609 (1972).
38. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81
S. Ct. 523 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585
(1965); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S. Ct.
1985]
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In Noerr, a group of trucking companies sued a group of railroads
for damages and to enjoin them from an alleged conspiracy to mo-
nopolize the long-distance freight business in violation of the antitrust
laws. The Court held that a complaint alleging mere attempts to influence
either the legislative branch for passage of laws (lobbying) or the ex-
ecutive branch for their enforcement (by conducting a publicity cam-
paign) stated no cause of action. The Court so held even though the
companies' sole purpose was to eliminate competition and their tactics
could be termed "unethical." This decision was premised first upon the
Court's refusal to impute to the Sherman Act39 an intent to regulate
political activity. The Court's rationale was that the basis of repre-
sentative democracy is the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to the government. 4° It was further premised upon the Court's
refusal to impute lightly to Congress an intent to invade the right of
petition, one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights.4' In a
footnote, however, the Court stated that it was unnecessary to decide
whether this conclusion was based on the First Amendment rather than
on the Sherman Act itself.4 2 Further, in dictum the Court stated:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, os-
tensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified. 43
In Pennington, the Court extended Noerr to attempts to influence
government officials performing purely commercial functions such as
the setting of the minimum wage in mining operations (executive action).
It held that "[joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate
the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such
conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." 44
Finally, in Trucking Unlimited, plaintiff motor carriers sued de-
fendant motor carriers for treble damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had conspired to monopolize trade by repeated
609 (1972); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 101 (1977);
Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 39, 60 (1980).
39. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1983).
40. 365 U.S. at 137, 81 S. Ct. at 529.
41. Id. at 138, 81 S. Ct. 530.
42. Id. at 132 n.6, 81 S. Ct. at 526-27 n.6.
43. Id. at 144, 81 S. Ct. at 533.
44. 381 U.S. at 670, 85 S. Ct. at 1593.
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institution of state and federal administrative and judicial proceedings
in opposition to applications by plaintiffs to acquire motor carrier op-
erating rights in California, "with or without probable cause, and re-
gardless of the merits of the cases." ' 45 The Court extended the Noerr
doctrine to concerted attempts to influence the courts and adjudicative
administrative bodies. Finding, however, that the allegations in plaintiffs'
complaint, if true, did state a cause of action, the Court reversed the
District Court's dismissal for no cause of action. It adopted its "sham
exception" dictum of Noerr, stating that the conspirators in Trucking
Unlimited had sought not "to influence" public officials but "to bar"
their competitors from meaningful access to judicial tribunals (an abuse
of process).
For the first time the Court in Trucking Unlimited firmly hinged
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine on the First Amendment. It found that,
though the petitioners have a right of access to agencies and courts to
be heard on applications sought by competitors, as part of their First
Amendment rights, that does not necessarily give them immunity from
the antitrust laws. Further, the Court concluded that the tribunal may
find an abuse of process from a series of claims, though a single baseless
claim may be inconclusive.4 6
In 1982 the Ninth Circuit held in Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Moun-
tain Motor Tariff7 that a single suit or protest may be sufficient to
invoke the sham exception.
The Constitutional Background
The First Amendment
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." '4 8 It does not, however, provide that a particular
forum will be available to air those grievances.
The Supremacy Clause
The "Supremacy Clause" provides that the United States Consti-
tution and federal laws are deemed the "supreme Law of the Land,"
binding the judges in every state. As previously discussed, the extent of
45. 404 U.S. at 512, 92 S. Ct. at 612.
46. Id. at 513, 92 S. Ct. at 613.
47. 674 F.2d 1252, 1265-67 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
48. U.S. Const. amend I.
19851
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
preemption of labor law was not clearly expressed in the Act and has
been left largely to interpretation by the courts. 49 Where tortious conduct
occurs during a labor dispute, going beyond activity protected by the
Act, local judicial protection has been allowed-including injunctive relief
and recovery of damages in a proper case. It is against this background
that the exceptions to federal preemption are considered, "since the
'Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other
relief' to the [state-court] plaintiff."' 0
The Commerce Clause
The protection of interstate commerce is the common thread between
labor and antitrust legislation. The Commerce Clause provides: "The
Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States ....
The National Labor Relations Acts
In passing the Wagner Act in 1935 (the first of three national labor
relations acts), Congress acted on the belief that economic disruptions
caused by labor-management disputes have an undesirable impact on
interstate commerce. A uniform scheme of regulation was required to
replace the varied, and commonly anti-collective-bargaining, policies em-
bodied in state law at that time. Interestingly, the Wagner Act was a
codification of the early view that the First Amendment protection of
freedom of speech was the rationale behind prohibited (state) government
intrusion into peaceful picketing. The Wagner Act was aimed at fostering
collective bargaining. Its doctrine was that federal law, through the
Supremacy Clause, 2 worked a pervasive preemption of potentially con-
flicting state regualtion.13 By placing formulation of national labor policy
in the hands of a federal administrative body entitled to deference in
its decisions, Congress removed jurisdiction from the federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, as well as from the state courts, subject
to limited federal judicial review . 4 Such review is a limited inquiry by
49. U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2. See supra text accompanying notes 7-18.
50. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting Linn, 383 U.S. at 63, 86 S. Ct. at
663).
51. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
53. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining
ch. 32, § 1, at 766 (1976).
54. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2174 (Brennan, J., concurring); Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289, 91 S. Ct. 1909, 1919 (1971); Garmon, 359
U.S. at 242-43, 79 S. Ct. at 778; Garner v. Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485,
490-91, 74 S. Ct. 161, 165-66 (1953).
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the Supreme Court, or other federal courts, into the "reasonableness"
of the Board's construction of the Act5 which need not be "the only
reasonable one or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. '5 6
The Antitrust Acts
Another purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act is the fostering
of interstate commerce. Section 1 declares illegal "[e]very contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations
. . . ., Section 6 of the Clayton Act specifically recognizes that labor
union activity is not an illegal combination in restraint of trade and
that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of
commerce." Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the filing of a well-
founded state court suit is not an activity in restraint of trade, whereas
under the Trucking Unlimited exception, sham litigation filed for har-
assment purposes does violate the antitrust acts.5 9
The Issues Before the Bill Johnson's Court
The Court had two basic issues to resolve: first, whether and under
what circumstances the ALJ or the Board could issue a cease and desist
order or petition a federal District Court for an injunction against the
proceedings in a state court civil suit; and second, whether and under
what circumstances the ALJ or the Board could find the filing and
prosecution of a state court suit, with a retaliatory motive, to be an
unfair labor practice.
The Injunction Issue
The Court had to balance the required preemptive application of
section 7 (protected activities) and sections 8(a)(1) and (4) (prohibited
55. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2170; Id. at 2174 (Brennan, J., concurring); FEC
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39, 102 S. ,Ct. 38, 46 (1981);
Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 95 S. Ct. 1470, 1480
(1975).
56. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. 2161, 2174 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 39, 102 S. Ct. at 46); NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2474-75 (1983).
57. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1983).
58. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 17, 26 (1983); National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 52 (1983).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
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activities) 6° of the NLRA 6' with (1) the jurisprudentially created excep-
tions to Board preemption, occasioned by tortious conduct during labor
disputes, (2) state interests in providing a forum for its citizens in such
instances, (3) an employer's First Amendment right to petition a court
for redress of grievances, and (4) the employer's interest in having a
state court jury determine factual issues in a civil suit.62 Emphasizing
that its role was that of limited judicial review, the Court applied the
historically established standards to determine whether the Board's inter-
pretation of the NLRA was a "reasonable" one.63 The Board's Power
Systems" position was that it was entitled to stop a state court proceeding
upon the finding of a retaliatory motive alone. Further, the Board felt
that its own determination that the state court suit was frivolous was
a sufficient one from which it could infer that the suit was improperly
motivated. 65 In Bill Johnson's, however, there was an independent basis
from which a retaliatory motive could be found: the alleged threats of
one of the managers to the family of a striking waitress that they would
"get hurt" and "lose their home" for picketing the employer. 66
The Court found that although the Board's statutory construction
of the text of the NLRA would otherwise have been a permissible one,67
this was negated, in a reasonably based suit, by the strong state interests
in providing a forum and by the employer's First Amendment right to
petition the courts. 6 The Court held that the "filing and prosecution
60. Section 7 guarantees employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, ...and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Section 8 governs employer-employee relations. Sections 8(a)(1) and (4), which are broad,
remedial provisions guaranteeing that employees' enjoyment of their rights under § 7 may
not be interfered with by their employer, read as follows:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [§ 7 of the Act] . . .
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter [§ 8 of the Act]
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (4) (1983).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 6-18, 37-56.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2170, id. at 2174 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Power Systems, 239 NLRB at 449-50. See also Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2166.
65. Bill Johnson's, 249 NLRB at 165; see also 103 S. Ct. at 2166.
66. 249 NLRB at 165; see also 103 S. Ct. at 2166.
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2170.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 2170. See supra text accompanying notes 6-18, 37-58.
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of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor
practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's
desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected
by the Act." 69
This holding is a well-reasoned and satisfactory one. The conclusions
reached by the Court after applying the historical factors of labor policy,
antitrust policy and constitutional considerations to the reasonably based
suit, to the baseless or frivolous suit, and to the standard of review at
the injunctive level, were best expressed by Justice Brennan in his con-
curring opinion:
The most reasonable inference to draw from the structure of
state-federal relations in this area is that the Board may enjoin
prosecution of a state lawsuit if, in addition to whatever other
findings are required to decide that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, it determines that controlling federal law bars
the plaintiff's right to relief, that clear state law makes the case
frivolous, or that no reasonable jury could make the findings
of fact in favor of the plaintiff that are necessary under ap-
plicable law. 70
The Reasonably Based Suit
Under the facts of Bill Johnson's, a finding that the state court
libel and business interference claims were reasonably based would clearly
bring such claims within the exceptions to Board preemption previously
recognized as strong state interests in providing a forum for conduct
" 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' .... Further, libel is
a named exception.72
In light of widespread preemption by the NLRA of state court
jurisdiction and the First Amendment's failure to specify that a plaintiff
is entitled to a particular forum for hearing, the Court's words regarding
constitutional implications appear to have been carefully chosen. These
words may warrant the conclusion that it was not the Court's desire
to hinge the right of the employer to bring a reasonably based state
court suit solely upon the First Amendment right to petition. The Court
noted that in Trucking Unlimited, it spoke of "construing" the antitrust
laws as allowing anticompetively motivated, but reasonably based, suits
69. 103 S. Ct. at 2170.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 2169 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244, 79 S. Ct. at 779).
72. Linn, 383 U.S. at 65, 86 S. Ct. at 664.
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to be filed as an "aspect" of First Amendment rights. 7 Further, the
Court in Bill Johnson's spoke of "sensitivity" to First Amendment
values in '.'construing" the Act. 74 The apparent intent of the Court was
to interpret the NLRA in such a way as to avoid a direct confrontation
with the First Amendment. In light of this apparent intent to avoid
conflict, it is interesting to note that in two subsequently decided non-
labor cases (United States v. Hylton 7 and Doe v. A Corporation76) the
Fifth Circuit cited Bill Johnson's as standing for the proposition that
the First Amendment right to petition protects a plaintiff's right to file
a reasonably based action in a judicial forum.
The Baseless Suit
The Court further held that, conversely, "it is an enjoinable unfair
labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating
against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the
NLRA. ' '77 Again applying the historical: considerations to the facts in
Bill Johnson's, it is reasonable to conclude that if the state court suit
is found to be frivolous or without a reasonable basis, state interests
in protecting domestic peace and in providing a forum for a nonjus-
ticiable controversy are negligible, if existant at all. 78 Further, where
litigation is based on knowingly false claims, it does not involve a bona
fide grievance and is in fact "sham" litigation. Thus, under Trucking
Unlimited,7 9 it falls within the sham exception to the First Amendment
73. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 511, 92 S. Ct. at 612; Bill Johnson's, 103 S.
Ct. at 2169.
74. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
75. 710 F.2d 1106, at 1111 (5th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs who had a long-running dispute
with the Internal Revenue Service were found not to be in criminal violation of federal
impediment charges for filing a "factually accurate, non-fraudulent criminal" trespass
charge with local officials.
76. 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983). Names of the parties involved were sealed, where
former corporate counsel in the employee benefits department sued on behalf of himself
and as a class action on behalf of all other employees to recover alleged overcharges by
the company on contributory insurance premiums. Judge Rubin, writing for the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, found that under Bill Johnson's, "[t]he right of access to the
courts may, in some circumstances, be protected by the first amendment right to petition
the government for redress of grievances." Id. at 1048 n.15. He held that the attorney
could not maintain the class action but that under due process and the first amendment,
he was not ethically barred from suing for his personal claims by reason of the attorney-
client relationship between him and his former employer. Id at 1044.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 2171.
78. Id. at 2170. See also supra text accompanying notes 6-18.
79. 404 U.S. at 512, 92 S. Ct. at 612.
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right to petition. By analogy to the rational of Herbert v. Lando80 and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,81 where knowing and recklessly-made false
statements were held not protected by the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech, knowingly false claims and frivolous litigation do
not constitute a legally protected injury to the plaintiff and are not
protected by the First Amendment right to petition the courts for redress
of grievances.
The Standard of Review at the Injunction State
The Court emphasized the necessity for deference to the Board in
formulating national labor policy. It further emphasized that its own
role was that of limited judicial review. At the same time, the Court
took great pains to set out detailed suggestions as to acceptable steps
which the Board could take.8 2 In reversing the Ninth Circuit and the
Board in Bill Johnson's, the Court noted that it was doing so because
the ALJ had gone beyond his authority in conducting a trial on the
merits in the state civil suit and in making credibility judgments which
the plaintiff-employer was entitled to have determined by a state court.
What the ALJ should have done on the libel claim, it reasoned, was
avoid making a credibility judgment as to whether genuine issues of
material fact were raised by the evidence presented.83
Further, in similar cases, the Court suggested that the Board, though
formulating its own policy, be mindful of suggested guidelines. It rea-
soned that the ALJ or the Board should determine first whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact to be deferred to a state tribunal for
trial. The Board may seek guidance from a summary judgment ("genuine
issue") or directed verdict ("reasonable jury") civil practice standard.
It may reject outright, plainly unsupportable inferences from the un-
80. 441 U.S. 153, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979). A retired Vietnam war veteran, who accused
superiors of covering up war crimes, was depicted as a liar in sensational media coverage.
Since he was now a "public figure," he was allowed to inquire into media editorial
processes to determine evidence critical to proof of his defamation suit, since "[sipreading
false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials." Id. at 171,
99 S. Ct. at 1646.
81. 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974). A reputable attorney was hired to represent
the family of a murder victim in its civil suit against the Chicago policeman convicted
of his murder. In his libel suit against a magazine publisher who depicted him as having
a criminal record, being a communist-fronter, and trying to discredit local police, the
Court found that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Id. at
339-49, 94 S. Ct. at 3007-11.
82. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2173.
83. Id.
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disputed facts and patently erroneous (knowingly false) submissions with
respect to material questions of fact and law.14 However, the AU or
the Board may not conduct a trial on the merits and resolve issues of
credibility of witnesses and draw inferences from undisputed facts, nor
may it decide issues turning on state law or mixed questions of fact
and state law. However, it may either rely upon documentary evidence
alone or hold a hearing.8 5
Where no facts are found to support a reasonable basis for the
suit, the AU or the Board may issue a cease and desist order or seek
to enjoin a pending state court suit or take the lack of facts tending
to show a reasonable basis into account in determining whether there
was a retaliatory motive behind the filing of the suit. Further, it may
find an unfair labor practice if the retaliatory motive is found, and
impose sanctions, including charging the employer with payment of the
employee's attorneys fees.
Where, however, the civil plaintiff can sufficiently prove the existence
of genuine material issues of fact or law, the Board must suspend its
consideration of the unfair labor practice charge until the state pro-
ceedings have been finally adjudicated.8 6
The Standard of Review After Final Adjudication of the
State Court Suit
The Unfair Labor Practice Issue
The Bill Johnson's Court established a clear two-pronged standard
for the unfair labor practice action: (1) the filing and prosecution of
an unmeritorious action, and (2) the state-court plaintiff's (i.e., the
employer) desire to retaliate against the state court defendant for ex-
ercising rights protected under the NLRA. The employer must fail both
prongs to lose on the unfair labor practice charge. It is for this reason
that the adjudication of the charge must be suspended until the state
court suit is finally disposed of or the AU or the Board permissibly
finds that the state claims are so deficient that they cannot pass a
summary judgment or similar standard.
The Meritorious Suit
Where the state court suit has been allowed to proceed and the
plaintiff wins his damages award, he necessarily passes one prong of
84. Id. at 2171 n.ll. Justice Brennan suggested that by analogy to Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979), a "state lawsuit may be regarded as having no
reasonable basis if no reasonable factfinder could give a verdict for the plaintiff." Id.
at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2171 n.11.
86. Id. at 2171-72.
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the unfair labor practice test. Therefore, despite an independently proven
retaliatory motive, the state court plaintiff must prevail on the unfair
labor practice charge.17 In light of historical considerations, this is a
satisfactory and fair result. Further, where a money judgment has been
awarded, there is room to infer that the motivation for the suit was
more closely related to the "too human" feeling of satisfaction felt by
the injured plaintiff when the injuring party gets his just due in court,
than it was related to coercion. 8
The Unmeritorious Suit
The Court again emphasized the deference owed to the Board in
determining labor policy in this area. Some of the examples of permissible
conclusions which the Board may derive in construing the NLRA appear
more ambiguous and less satisfactory in this area than those allowed
in the injunction area. At least four such areas can be identified: (1)
the definition of unmeritorious, (2) the burden of proof required, (3)
the "bootstrapping" of the retaliatory motive, and (4) the "one claim"
theory. It is important to keep in mind that the relative economic power
and bargaining power of an employer, a union, a union employee, or
a non-union employee seeking union representation, and their abilities
to harass, coerce, or damage the opposing party in a labor dispute,
shift from case to case. In Bill Johnson's an employer discharged a
non-union, hourly paid employee and then sought a money judgment
in state court for libel, under circumstances from which it is reasonable
to infer that the employer occupied the stronger position.8 9 In Power
Systems, a union steward caused employers to defend and pay legal fees
for some 46 claims before the Board, of which some 40 were dismissed
or withdrawn, under circumstances from which it is reasonable to infer
that the union steward's ability to harass and damage employers gave
him the stronger position. 9 In Garner v. Teamsters Local 776 a union
caused a 95% drop in an employer's business by picketing and using
tactics calculated to coerce the employer to violate statutes forbidding
the employer to attempt to influence employees to join the union. 9' In
that case the union appeared to occupy the stronger position. Further,
in Sheet Metal Workers a union instructed an employer to discharge a
union employee for alleged non-payment of dues and then sued the ex-
union employee in state court for libel. 92 Once again the union appeared
to occupy the stronger position. The Bill Johnson's Court noted that
87. Id. at 2172.
88. See supra note 19.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
90. 239 NLRB at 458.
91. 346 U.S. 485, 487, 74 S. Ct. 161, 164 (1953).
92. .716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983).
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the need for Board interference to justify a remedy is at its greatest
where an employer sues hourly-paid employees not backed by a union. 93
However, the Board's formulation of a basic policy which always pre-
supposes an employer's superior economic and bargaining strength and
improper motivation ignores the realities of the situation. It is suggested
that the Board exercise a narrower range of discretion than that found
permissible by the Court in these areas, as the Board had already done
in construing other sections of the NLRA.
The Definition of Unmeritorious
In Bill Johnson's, the Court provided that if judgment goes against
the employer in state court or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise
shown to be without merit, the Board would be warranted in taking
that into account in determining an unfair labor practice and imposing
sanctions. If the Board finds that the suit is filed in retaliation for the
employee's exercise of his section 7 protected rights, it may order rein-
statement, payment of defendant-employees' attorney fees and other
expenses, and may grant other proper relief under section 10(c). 94 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted: "Reasonable people can
differ over the wisdom of deciding that a nonfrivolous suit which is
withdrawn, or in which plaintiff does not ultimately prevail, constitutes
an unfair labor practice, . . . but that is a question of labor policy for
the Board to decide in the first instance." 9 The Board probably draws
guidance from title VII employment discrimination cases awarding at-
torneys fees to defendants. In those cases the Court has defined "un-
meritorious" in a different manner. These cases appear analogous to
Bill Johnson's in some respects; for the sanctions imposed on an em-
ployer found to have committed an unfair labor practice under section
10(c) include reinstatement of a discharged employee, back pay, and
posting of a notice of the adverse findings of the Board. Additionally,
a very costly penalty is the imposition on the employer of payment of
the employee's attorneys fees. Labor disputes often give rise to two or
more unfair labor practice charges, however. In Bill Johnson's, for
instance, the Board had already imposed reinstatement, back pay, and
notice-posting penalties on the employer for wrongful discharge of the
employee. Only the state-court attorneys fees remained at stake. This
may frequently be the case where the filing of a state-court suit takes
place after other disputed activity has resulted in the filing of prior
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
94. Id. at 2172.
95. Id. at 2175 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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unfair labor practice charges. In employment discrimination cases in-
terpreting section 706(k) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,96
the definition given to the unmeritorious suit is more analogous to the
Bill Johnson's Court's definition of "sham" litigation at the injunctive
level. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,97 the Court held that although a prevailing plaintiff in a
title VII discrimination charge98 is ordinarily to be awarded attorney
fees, a prevailing defendant is to be awarded such fees only when the
court, in its discretion, has found that the plaintiff's action was "friv-
olous, unreasonable, or without foundation." In approving, with minor
qualifications, earlier Court of Appeals definitions of meritless suits in
employment discrimination actions, 99 the Christiansburg Court indicated
that the term "meritless" meant "groundless" or "without founda-
tion"-it was not to be understood as meaning simply that the plaintiff
had ultimately lost his case. In title VII cases, the District Courts have
discretion to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant upon a
finding that the plaintiff's case, even though not brought in subjective
bad faith, was unreasonable, frivolous, or without foundation. The
Christiansburg Court further stated that since a plaintiff can seldom be
sure of ultimate success, to hold otherwise would discourage all but the
most airtight claims.'0° Further, because the course of litigation is rarely
predictable, a plaintiff may still ultimately lose no matter how fervently
he believes in his cause and the merit of his claim. The major distinction
here is that one prong of the employment discrimination test is milder
than that adopted in Bill Johnson's, and the other is more rigid. Here,
bad faith is irrelevant (compare this with the retaliatory motive).
The meritless suit alone is sufficient to invoke the sanctions (compare
the original Board position under its Power Systems rationale). The
incongruity of results in the title VII suits and unfair labor practice
suits can be seen, as follows:
A title VII plaintiff suing in: (1) good faith but losing a suit not
found to be frivolous or groundless owes no attorney's fees to defendant,
(2) bad faith but losing a suit not found to be frivolous or groundless
owes no attorney's fees to defendant, (3) good or bad faith but losing
a suit also found to be frivolous or groundless owes attorney's fees to
defendant.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1983).
97. 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694 (1978).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1983).
99. See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 363, 365 (3rd Cir.
1975); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. 434 U.S. at 421-22, 98 S. Ct. at 700-01.
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Contrariwise, a section 7 plaintiff suing in state court in: (1) bad
faith but losing, at the injunctive level, a suit found to be frivolous or
groundless owes attorney's fees to defendant, but the Board has in effect
mitigated his damages by cutting off the suit at an early stage so that
defendant's attorney fees will be minimized; (2) good faith but losing,
in a close vote a suit not found to be frivolous or groundless (and thus
allowed to go forward rather than be enjoined) owes attorney fees to
defendant, because the Board may "bootstrap" and infer a retaliatory
motive, where none may have existed, from the fact that the plaintiff
lost the case. This is discussed in this article in the section on "boots-
trapping."'' t The test provided in employment discrimination cases pro-
duces a more equitable result.
The Burden of Proof Required in Determining an Improper Motive
Another area from which the Board may seek guidance is found
within labor legislation itself. The Court and the Board have applied a
two-pronged test in the "dual motive discharge" cases under sections
8(a)(l) and (3) and 10(c) of the NLRA.10 2 In NLRB vs. Transportation
Management Corp.,03 the Court upheld the Board's Wright Line'°4
rationale which had previously received a mixed reception in the Circuit
Courts. In these "dual motive discharge" cases, the Board alleged that
an employee was fired for union activity (illegal cause); however, the
employer attempted to show that the employee would have been fired
anyway for serious infractions of company rules (legal cause). Section
10(c) of the NLRA imposes upon the General Counsel of the Board
the burden of persuasion "upon a preponderance of the testimony
taken,"'' 5 to prove the unfair labor practice. Under its Wright Line
doctrine, the Board had reallocated the burden of proof. The Board's
General Counsel must carry the burden of persuasion that the anti-
union feeling contributed to an employer's decision to fire an employee.
Although this burden does not shift, the employer was effectively ex-
tended an affirmative defense. This defense allowed the employer (even
the employer who could not counter the General Counsel's showing of
union animus) to avoid being found in violation of the NLRA (no
unfair labor practice). The employer had to carry the burden of per-
suasion that the employee had engaged in other activities violating cor-
101. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
102. See supra note 1.
103. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
104. Wright Line and Bernard R. LaMoreaux, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enforced, 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1983).
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pany rules for which he would have been fired anyway, even if he had
not engaged in union organizing activity.10 6 Although in Transportation
Management the employer failed to carry this burden, 0 7 the affirmative
defense is available in a proper case. The Transportation Management
Court found that although sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 10(c) of the Act
did not mandate such an allocation of the burden of persuasion, the
Board's construction was a permissible one. 0 8 It seems significant that
the Board itself recognized (and the Court agreed) that where an em-
ployer has another sufficiently strong legal motive for a discharge, it
neutralizes a concurrent illegal anti-union motive, which means no unfair
labor practice.
Two observations on Transportation Management are appropriate.
This sections 8(a)(1) and (3) "dual motive discharge" case was argued
the same week as Bill Johnson's and decided two weeks after Bill
Johnson's was decided. Having both issues before it at the same time,
the Court chose to go outside the labor area to compare "dual motive
suit filing" in both the labor and antitrust areas rather than to stay
within the labor area and compare the "dual motive suit filing" with
the "dual motive discharge." First, the Court adopted different two-
pronged tests in the sham-litigation cases and in the dual-motive-discharge
cases. In the discharge cases, the Board itself had long recognized that
perfectly valid legal and illegal motives could be present for the same
activity, and that the legal motive could predominate over the illegal
one. In the state-court-suit-filing cases, it is the Board itself that held
firm to its position that the illegal activity (retaliatory motive) alone
should prevail over the legal activity (filing of a well-founded state court
suit). The sections 8(a)(1) and (3) preponderance-of-the-testimony test
would seem to lend itself to the sections 8(a)(l) and (4) problems
identified in Bill Johnson's. Generally, any standard of proof "serves
to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the
relative importance attached to the ultimate decision."' 0 9 A preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard allows both parties to "share the risk of
106. Transportation Management, 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
107. See supra note 1. Under facts similar to the original complaint filed by waitress
Helton in Bill Johnson's, and similar to those in Wright Line, a senior favored employee
who had never before been reprimanded was fired shortly after the employee began union
organizing activities, on charges of minor company rule infractions. Such alleged infractions
caused no harm to the employer and gave no real benefit to the employee, and occured
under circumstances which investigation showed to appear to have been dreamed up after
the firing. Further, no disciplinary action was taken against other employees for similar
infractions, and no warnings were given to the fired employee before the firing, which
was contrary to usual company practices.
108. 103 S. Ct. at 2474-75.
109. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (1979).
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error in roughly equal fashion.""10 Any other standard, such as "proof
by clear and convincing evidence," expresses a preference for the side's
interests that are at stake, such as termination of parental rights, in-
voluntary commitment prodeedings, or deportation proceedings."' Thus,
in a typical civil suit for money damages or in administrative proceedings
which may expose a party to criminal prosecution, "preponderance" is
the standard chosen." 2 Thus, the effect of the different standards could
be the same, and there is no reason why the Board could not, in its
discretion, apply the burden of persuasion standard to the sections 8(a)(1)
and (4) cases. This would minimize the exposure of an employer, who
sued in state court in good faith, to the "bootstrapping" risk discussed
below.
"Bootstrapping" the Retaliatory Motive
The preceding two sections of this Article have been concerned with
how frivolous or unmeritorious a suit must be before an unfair labor
practice may be found. Although the Court clearly precluded the Board
from finding an unfair labor practice upon the finding of a retaliatory
motive alone," 3 it appears to have opened the door to bootstrapping
the necessary retaliatory motive from a' finding that a suit was "un-
meritorious." The Court propounded that where the employer's suit was
found unmeritorious (had an adverse judgment or was withdrawn or
was otherwise shown to be without merit), "the Board would be war-
ranted in taking that fact into account in determining whether the suit
had been filed in retaliation for the exercise of the employees' section
7 rights." 14 In Bill Johnson's, both the ALJ and the Board found an
allegedly independent basis for the retaliatory motive, the alleged threats
to a striking waitress's family by a company manager that they would
"get hurt" and "lose their home" for participating in the picketing and
handbilling."15 Where a suit is shown to be so patently frivolous or
groundless that it cannot survive a summary judgment or similar stand-
ard, it seems reasonable to infer the existence of a retaliatory motive
from the facts, whether or not an independent motive could be estab-
110. Id.
111. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86, 87 S. Ct.
483, 487-88 (1966).
112. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979); SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355,
64 S. Ct. 120, 125 (1943).
113. Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2168.
114. Id. at 2172 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 2165.
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lished. However, suppose an employer who has suffered monetary losses
from a labor dispute brings a reasonably-based, well-prepared case in
good faith in state court. If the employer loses such a suit on a close
vote or on procedural grounds, reasonable minds might differ as to
whether he had a retaliatory motive. However, under the Court's holding,
the Board is allowed to infer a retaliatory motive (bootstrapping) from
this result and to conclude that the suit was unmeritorious. Furthermore,
the Board may use the inferred retaliatory motive to meet both prongs
of the unfair labor practice test.
The "One Claim" Theory
In Trucking Unlimited, the antitrust case upon which part of the
Bill Johnson's rationale is based, the Court held that a fact-finder may
find an abuse of administrative or judicial processes from a pattern of
baseless claims."16 Further, the Ninth Circuit in Clipper Exxpress found
that a single suit or protest was sufficient to invoke the sham exception." 7
In a footnote, the Bill Johnson's Court appears to have extended to
the labor area the rationale of Clipper Exxpress: that a single baseless
claim may give rise to a finding of sham litigation. The language of
the Court provided:
It appears that only the libel count remains pending before
the state court. If petitioner's other claims have been finally
adjudicated to be lacking in merit, on remand the Board may
reinstate its finding that petitioner acted unlawfully by prose-
cuting these unmeritorious claims if the Board adheres to its
previous finding that the suit was filed for a retaliatory pur-
pose. 8
Did the Court, in the context of Bill Johnson's, really have something
else in mind and not intend this result? While it may seem appropriate
to find that a single suit composed of five or six frivolous claims (in
the antitrust context of Clipper Exxpress) is the equivalent of a single
frivolous claim, it is more difficult to understand a ruling which would
allow a state court civil suit, composed of six claims (five of which are
won and result in an award of money damages) to be termed "un-
meritorious" because the sixth claim either does not survive a summary
judgment motion or is lost when finally adjudicated. Further, the ruling
would allow a bootstrapping of a retaliatory motive from the one lost
claim and a finding of an unfair labor practice, even though the plaintiff
116. 404 U.S. at 513, 92 S. Ct. at 613.
117. 674 F.2d at 1265-67.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 2174 n.15.
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has a meritorious suit on five of the six claims originally pursued. It
may be that this "one claim" in the Bill Johnson's context refers to a
grouping of related claims, where the libel count survived summary
judgment-the business interference counts, composed of mass picketing,
blocking the sidewalk, harrassing customers, etc. did not. It may be
that this grouping of a number of claims found baseless by the state
court contributed to the statement by the Supreme Court that the Board
would be warranted in reinstating its previous finding of an unfair labor
practice. Each grouping of claims (libel with business interference, as
compared to libel and antitrust, for instance) might be composed of
several related claims. It may be that the overall group is found un-
meritorious, rather than one single count within the suit.
Application of the Standards
The Board has not yet issued its decision on the remanded Bill
Johnson's case,"19 nor has any other sections 8(a)(1) and (4) case come
before the Board.
The Ninth Circuit has applied the Bill Johnson's standards, however,
in Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local No. 355 v.
NLRB,120 an employee-union labor dispute. Sections 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A),
and 8(b)(2) were allegedly violated.' 2' The ALJ and the Board had
decided the case under the Power Systems 2 2 rationale, and the task for
the Ninth Circuit was to apply the Bill Johnson's concepts after the
fact.
119. Lawrence Katz, counsel for employer, revealed that on remand by the Ninth
Circuit the Board asked both parties to submit position papers but, as of March 4, 1984
had taken no further action pending its decision on whether the matter should be further
remanded to the ALJ. Telephone interview with Lawrence Katz, of Phoenix, Ariz. (March
4, 1985). In the meantime, a settlement of the state court libel suit and countersuit has
been negotiated (withdrawal of claims by both sides). The waitresses remain unrepresented
by any union, and issues of reinstatement and back pay were settled by the parties after
remand of the § 8(a)(3) claim to the Ninth Circuit. The parties agreed in the settlement
of the state court libel suit that attorney fees for the winning side in the Supreme Court
decision would be paid by the losing side. In light of the Court's new position however,
and its remand to the Board for further action, the matter of attorney fees remains
unsettled.
120. 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. See supra note 1; 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(l)(A),
(b)(2), which provide in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 157 of this title. ..
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section.
122. 239 NLRB 445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
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In Sheet Metal Workers', a union left instructions with an employer
to discharge an employee if his dues were not paid by Friday. The
employee mailed his dues on Thursday, alleging the union had given
him an oral extension of time. The employer discharged him on Friday,
and the money order arrived on Monday. The employee brought unfair
labor practice charges before the Board against the union for wrongfully
causing his discharge. The union emphatically denied the oral extension
of time and filed suit in state court for $30,000 in unspecified damages
(sounding in libel and slander) 23 for the employee's wrongfully claiming
the union had breached its duty to the employee. The Board affirmed
the ALJ's acceptance of the employee's testimony as to the oral exten-
sion, its findings as to an unfair labor practice for the wrongful dis-
charge, and its order for back pay and reinstatement. The decision
recognized that the Board may, on its own, address an issue of retaliatory
suit-filing (to punish an employee for filing charges before the Board)
under the doctrine of NLRB v. Fant Milling Co. 12 4 Further, the Board
issued a cease and desist order to stop the state court suit, and ordered
payment of the employee's attorney fees. The union appealed to the
Ninth Circuit and the Board moved for enforcement.
The Ninth Circuit found that the critical issue was whether or not
an oral extension of time to pay dues had been granted. It found that
the union's affidavits were insufficient to show there was no genuine
issue of material fact and held that the union had violated its fiduciary
duty to the employee to give him clear notice of the steps he must take
concerning his dues-related obligations in order to keep his job. Finding
the union's activities to be an unfair labor practice, the court ordered
the union to pay back-pay until the employee was reinstated. The Court
of Appeals also found that substantial evidence supported the Board's
finding that the state suit was brought in subjective bad faith, but that
since it did present genuine issues of material fact, under Bill Johnson's,
it could not be enjoined. 5 The court noted, however, that the disputed
facts underlying the state court suit were already before the board and
were within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction. 26
The disposition of Sheet Metal Workers' raises new questions as to
the reach of Bill Johnson's. In Bill Johnson's, the facts giving rise to
the initial unfair labor practice charge (firing an employee for engaging
in union activity) were entirely separate from the facts giving rise to
the second charge (filing a state court suit for damages occasioned by
tortious picket line conduct-or to retaliate against the employee for
123. 716 F.2d at 1266-67 (Poole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. 360 U.S. 301, 306-09, 79 S. Ct, 1179, 1182-84 (1959).
125. 716 F.2d at 1254-64.
126. Id. at 1263.
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filing a Board charge). The discharge claim had already been decided
adversely to the employer and was not before the Supreme Court. The
Court held, however, that "the Board must await the results of the
state-court adjudication with respect to the merits of the state suit.' ' 27
In Sheet Metal Workers', however, the crucial facts and issue underlying
both the initial Board charge and the state-court suit were identical-
whether an oral extension of time had been granted for the employee
to pay his dues. This raises the issue whether, in such cases, the entire
Board proceedings must be halted until the state court had made the
credibility determination and decided the issues of fact. The majority
in Sheet Metal Workers' says no. If they are correct, then Bill Johnson's
affords the risk of inconsistent judgments in the two forums involved-
the' state court may accept the testimony of the union that no oral
extension was granted, award a money judgment to the union, and
foreclose the Board from finding an unfair labor practice on the state-
court-suit filing. On the other hand, the Board may, as it did here,
accept the employee's testimony that an oral extension of time was
granted, that he was unlawfully discharged, and find an unfair labor
practice on that count and order back pay and other proper remedies.
The majority read Bill Johnson's to allow the Board to proceed to
decision on all charges before it, except the question of whether the
state court suit *may be enjoined.
Judge Poole, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in a strongly
worded opinion, urged the majority to re-read Bill Johnson's. His ra-
tionale was that where the underlying issues of fact on the consolidated
unfair labor practice chargaes are the same, "the Board cannot continue
its own proceeding if it necessarily involves determining that same issue
of which the state-court [sic] has acquired proper jurisdiction, '1 28 since
the state court is entitled to that kind of deference. If the dissent is
correct, the Board would be stripped of jurisdiction of the entire pro-
ceeding, where the underlying factual issues are the same, though this
primary jurisdiction has previously been accorded to it jurisprudentially
under the Sears-Garmon line of cases. 2 9 The result, however, would be
a state-court determination of factual questions which it appears the
Board would be bound to follow when it reacquired jurisdiction after
the state-court suit had been finally adjudicated.130
Summary and Conclusion
In the course of a labor dispute, an employer or other party may
be damaged by-tortious conduct of an employee or other opposing party,
127. .103 S. Ct. at 2173.
128. 716 F.2d at 1265 (Poole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. 716 F.2d at 1263. See supra text accompanying notes 6-18.
130. 716 F.2d at 1267 (Poole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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which is beyond the scope of activities protected or prohibited by the
NLRA. Where jurisdiction over such conduct is jurisprudentially excepted
from preemption by the Board and touches upon interests in which a
state has a strong desire to provide a forum for its citizens, the employer
may file a state-court civil damage suit as an aspect of his First Amend-
ment right to petition the courts for redress of grievances. Unless the
suit is clearly frivolous or baseless, the Board may not issue a cease
and desist order or petition a federal court to enjoin its prosecution
even if there is evidence that the suit was brought to coerce or punish,
the other party for using Board processes. The Board's jurisdiction is
suspended until the merits of the state suit have been resolved. Further,
if the employer wins, the Board may not find the filing of the suit to
be an unfair labor practice, regardless of whether an independently
proved improper motivation for the suit filing is found.
This limitation on the ability of the Board to halt prosecution of
the state civil suit, however, "is not the measure of its ability to
determine that such prosecution constitutes an unfair labor practice,"
or to impose sanctions authorized by subsection 10(c) of the Act,'' nor
does it bear upon the ability of the state court defendant to successfully
raise defenses to his conduct.12 The Board may find the state civil suit.
to be retaliatorily motivated when "substantial evidence" exists that the
suit was so motivated, which may be determined by independent conduct
of the employer or may be inferred from the fact that the suit is either
so frivolous or baseless that the Board is entitled to enjoin it in the
first instance, or from the fact that the suit is ultimately lost or with-
drawn. Further, the Board may find an unfair labor practice and impose
sanctions where both the retaliatory motive is -present and the suit is
found to be unmeritorious, whether in the sense of being patently-
frivolous or groundless, or in the sense of being ultimately lost or
withdrawn.
The Board is entitled to deference in formulating national labor
policy, within these broad guidelines, subject to limited federal court
judicial review as to whether its conclusions are "reasonable" construc-
tions of the NLRA. Keeping in mind the shifting balance of relative-
economic and bargaining power among an employer, union, and -an
employee with or without union affiliation, it is hoped that the Board
will formulate policy drawn from prior labor and outside precedents
which will more narrowly apply the Bill Johnson's standards and will-
allow a retaliatory motive to be inferred from a state-court-suit, filing:
only in the most extreme cases.
Barbara Pruyn Gill
131. 103 S. Ct. at 2175 (Brennan, J., concurring)
132. Accord, United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1111 n.7 (5th Cir. 1983).
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